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Abstract 
Recent anxieties over the digital divide have centered on the observation that uptake of the 
internet is shaped by a number of identifiable, place-based factors. Yet is the internet any more a 
product of material geography than previous communication technologies? Our contribution in 
the present article seeks to address this question by deploying quantitative techniques to examine 
whether the country-level adoption of past communication networks – mail, telegrams and 
telephone – was shaped by similar socioeconomic factors. Our results reveal striking similarities 
in the domestic attributes – income, education and trade openness – influencing rates of uptake 
across all four technologies during their major periods of diffusion.  
 




The emergence of the internet has been greeted with a mix of optimism and pessimism (The 
Economist 2007). On the one hand, cyber-optimists have celebrated the potential ability of the 
internet to free people from traditional place-based constraints, and how the technology provides 
new opportunities for previously marginalized actors to engage in distanciated forms of 
communication, political mobilization and economic exchange (Negroponte 1998; Friedman 
2005; Tapscott and Williams 2007). On the other hand, cyber-pessimists have drawn attention to 
the internet’s divisive nature, pointing towards its tendency to reinforce existing and generate 
new socio-economic inequalities across space (UNDP 2001; Lucas and Sylla 2003; Stevens and 
O’Hara 2006). 
Many geographers, but not all, have fallen into this latter camp (Torrens 2008). Hence, 
they have highlighted the existence of inequalities in internet availability, access and usage, 
widely-dubbed the “digital divide” (Graham 2008). Moreover, calling into question cyber-
optimists’ claims about the uniquely emancipatory nature of the technology, they have suggested 
that these divides are mapped onto existing spatial inequalities (Warf 2001; Zook et al. 2004). 
Indeed, far from eliminating the significance of material geography, it is argued that the 
grounding of the global internet network in particular territories is crucially dependent on 
enabling place-based characteristics (Malecki 2002; Warf 2007). 
All of which raises an important question: is the internet any different from previous 
technologies? We know from recent statistical research that uptake of the internet has been 
governed by a number of identifiable place-based factors. Yet was the uptake of past 
communication technologies constrained by similar geographic attributes? Understanding this 
question is instructive about the extent to which uptake of the internet is more a product of 
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material geography and therefore likely to accentuate inequalities (Cutter et al. 2002). More 
generally, it says a great deal about continuity in the geographic patterns of diffusion, and 
whether we can make predictions about the future of the internet on the basis of previous 
technologies (Perkins and Neumayer 2005).  
Our contribution in the present article tackles this question. Focusing on the digital divide 
at the global scale, we use large-sample econometric techniques to investigate whether the 
internet is any different by examining the domestic determinants governing the spatio-temporal 
diffusion of two public mobilities (i.e. mail and telegrams) and two personal mobilities (i.e. 
telephones and the internet) across countries (Kellerman 2006). Our results highlight a high 
degree of continuity, in that many of the same basic country socioeconomic characteristics – 
income, education and trade openness – are found to shape the uptake of all four technologies 
constituting different mobilities during their major periods of diffusion. 
 
The global digital divide and its underlying determinants  
Although the digital divide is a complex construct, which can be understood in many different 
ways, mainstream accounts have tended to define it in terms of variations in the spatial or social 
distribution of internet infrastructure, access and/or usage (Corrocher and Ordanini 2002, Selwyn 
2004; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Lal 2005). Such divides have been identified at a number of 
different spatial scales (Warf 2001). Thus, digital divides have been documented at the 
national/sub-national scale, e.g. spatially between urban and rural areas (Whitacre and Mills 
2007) and socially between different ethnic/racial groups (Gibson 2003); macro-regional scale, 
e.g. between countries or cities in the same region (Chin 2005; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Lal 
2005), and at the global scale (Drori and Jang 2002; Dutta and Mia 2008). 
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 At the latter scale, much of the existing literature has focused on aspects of the ‘global 
divide’ (Norris 2001, pg.4) in internet availability, access or usage between developed 
economies, on the one hand, and developing economies, on the other (UNDP 2001; Drori and 
Jang 2002; Dutta and Mia 2008). This reflects concern about the impact of the digital divide on 
poverty, economic growth and other aspects of development in low-income countries, and how 
the internet may entrench existing socio-spatial inequalities (Lucas and Sylla 2003; James 2007; 
Al-Fahad 2008). Indeed, a common theme of applied, and many academic, discourses 
surrounding the global digital divide is that narrowing the gap in internet access will help low-
income countries to modernize and develop (see Graham 2008). Yet, as shown in figure 1, the 
digital divide not only exists between developed and developing countries. Within each of these 
generic country groupings, cross-national variations in internet uptake can be found, pointing to a 
more complex geography of digital inequality. 
 
 
Figure 1 around here 
 
 
 One way of thinking about these cross-national variations in internet uptake is as a case of 
spatio-temporal diffusion (Wood 1998; Comer and Wilke 2008). Briefly, diffusion can be 
understood as a process whereby a new innovation spreads through a social system over time, 
sometimes replacing (or partially substituting) existing innovations (O’Loughlin et al. 1988; 
Shiode et al. 2004; Perkins and Neumayer 2005). Two main mechanisms are identified in the 
literature to explain diffusion: (a) epidemic-type dynamics whereby contact with previous 
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adopters stimulates uptake as potential adopters learn about a new innovation and; (b) economic-
type mechanisms whereby potential users adopt a new innovation as it becomes profitable, with 
uptake characteristically spreading as costs lower or returns improve over time in response to 
learning. For the former, spatio-temporal variations in uptake reflect differences in patterns of 
contact between adopters and potential adopters; whereas economic accounts emphasize 
variations in the characteristics of adopters, with some actors better able to afford the costs of an 
innovation or exploit its economic benefits (Rogers 1995). 
Implicitly or explicitly, both of these explanations have been invoked in recent work 
concerned with the international diffusion of the internet. Empirically, this work has identified a 
number of domestic, contextual factors underpinning cross-national differences in internet 
penetration. The most important of these determinants, and one which resonates closely with 
broader concerns about the global digital divide discussed above, is wealth. In nearly all studies, 
per capita income emerges as a positive correlate of internet hosts and/or users, across both 
developed and developing country samples (Bauer et al. 2002; Baliamoune-Lutz 2003; Guillén 
and Suárez 2005; Crenshaw and Robison 2006). The importance of wealth can readily be 
explained in terms of economic-type models: connecting to the global internet network requires 
large capital investments (e.g. in terms of hubs and lines) and users have to be able to afford 
access charges and interface hardware. Hence, effective demand for the internet is likely to be 
greater in wealthier countries, providing an incentive for private sector investments in internet 
infrastructure and services. At the same time, private and public actors in wealthier countries are 
more likely to possess the financial capacity to fund these investments, or else raise finance from 
capital markets (Beilock and Dimitrova 2003; Lucas and Sylla 2003; Warf and Vincent 2007).  
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While income explains a large amount of cross-national inequalities, the literature 
identifies three further determinants. One of the most widely studied is human capital with a large 
number of studies showing that education exerts a positive influence on domestic uptake of the 
internet (Kiiski and Pohjola 2002; Baliamoune-Lutz 2003; Quibria et al. 2003; Andonova 2006; 
Liu and Gee 2006; Vicente and López 2007). Most likely, this is explained by the importance of 
linguistic and computer literacy for internet usage, but also by the fact that an educated workforce 
makes it easier and cheaper to install, operate and maintain the network infrastructure needed to 
connect to the global internet network (Lucas and Sylla 2003; Chin 2005; Warf and Vincent 
2007; Comer and Wilke 2008).  
Institutional quality, in terms of how well the institutions of state function, make 
decisions and exercise authority, is another attribute found to affect uptake (Guillén and Suárez 
2001; Hargittai 1999; Andonova 2006; Chin and Fairlie 2006; Crenshaw and Robison 2006; Liu 
and Gee 2006). Its significance is widely attributed to the influence of a country’s legal, political 
and regulatory environment over commercial investment decisions (Henisz and Zelner 2001). 
Investors are more likely to make large capital outlays in telecommunications infrastructure 
where the institutional environment provides stable, secure and credible conditions for 
investment, such that investors are more likely to obtain economic returns from their outlays. 
A third variable is trade (Baliamoune-Lutz 2003). Trade potentially lowers the costs of 
acquiring the technologies required to interface with the internet, as well as increasing the 
economic incentives to adopt competitiveness-enhancing technologies, of which the internet is a 
prime example. The influence of trade might also plausibly work via contagion as actors in one 
country learn about and emulate technological choices made in another country. Finally, a 
number of studies have identified a role for domestic telecommunications policy, with 
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privatization, deregulation and policies fostering greater price competition between service 
providers – for example, through mandatory unbundling and access to the local loop – identified 
as a positive correlate of internet diffusion in samples of wealthier countries (Hargittai 1999; 
Bauer et al. 2002; Guillén and Suárez 2005; Warf 2007).  
 
Is the internet any different?  
The finding that internet adoption has been constrained by fairly durable contextual factors would 
appear to support cyber-pessimists’ arguments about the tendency of the technology to reproduce 
existing geographic inequalities. The question addressed in the present article, however, is 
whether the internet is any different. At a conceptual level, there are a number of compelling 
reasons to believe that similar socioeconomic attributes may have influenced the uneven 
geographic uptake and diffusion of past communication technologies. 
As with the internet, technologies such as mail, telegraphy and telephony comprise 
complementary networks of physical artifacts, supporting infrastructures and users (Hugill 1999). 
Moreover, the grounding of these elements in place-based contexts is likely to have similarly 
depended on the hardware and software required to make the technology function, as well as the 
ability, willingness and motivation of potential adopters to make use of communications services.  
We therefore expect income to have played an equally pivotal role in the uptake of older 
communication technologies. As with the internet, domestic demand for mail, telegraph and 
telephone is likely to have risen with per capita income, in that wealthier individuals should have 
been better able to afford respective user charges and possibly have greater uses for these media. 
On the supply-side, income is also likely to have been important, with the ability of private or 
public actors to respond to this demand by making capital-intensive infrastructural investments 
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likely to have increased with wealth (Willmore 2002). In much the same way as the internet, 
demand for past communication services is likely to have been influenced by the ability of actors 
to use them, and therefore by basic levels of education. An educated population may have 
additionally supported the effective and cost-efficient installation, operation and maintenance of 
communication systems, facilitating their expansion. 
Investments in capital-intensive infrastructures such as the electric telegraph and 
telephone services are also likely to have been sensitive to the domestic regulatory, legal and 
political environment. In much the same way as the internet, the existence of weak, unstable 
and/or corrupt political institutions would plausibly have hindered the willingness of profit-
seeking private actors to invest, retarding the expansion of new communications infrastructure. 
Additionally, institutional instability will have made it less likely that governments would be able 
to commit to, raise finance for, and complete large public-sector communications projects, such 
as the construction of telegraphy networks. 
Similarly, the commercial value of mail, telegraph and telephones in facilitating 
international exchange, together with greater competitive pressures, means that demand for long-
distance communications services is likely to have been greater in open economies. The 
geopolitical significance of trade for maintaining or extending economic and political power is 
also known to have led governments of major trading economies such as Britain to subsidize the 
development of public mobilities such as inter-country telegraphy networks (Hugill 1999). 
Additionally, trade is likely to have been instrumental in spreading awareness about new 
communication technologies, with domestic firms learning from their foreign counterparts 
(Standage 1998). As per contagion models, such knowledge may have subsequently spilled-over 
into the wider population, stimulating uptake by private individuals. 
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Of course, the ultimate arbiter of whether the geographic determinants of the internet and 
earlier communication technologies are similar is empirical study. There is some existing 
evidence which points to continuity. Quibria et al. (2003) and Torero et al. (2006), for example, 
find a positive relationship between GDP per capita and the number of telephone mainlines. 
Henisz and Zelner (2001) show that institutional quality has a negative influence on the uptake of 
digital telephone infrastructure. Similarly, Quibria et al. (2003) find that more educated countries 
have more telephone mainlines, while Perkins and Neumayer (2005) estimate a positive 
relationship between levels of trade openness and the uptake of digital telephony. More generally, 
Arnum and Conti (1998) find a positive, bivariate correlation between the wired ratio (the sum of 
electricity usage, phone lines and televisions per capita) and the internet ratio (the sum of internet 
hosts, domains and web pages per capita). 
Yet these studies hardly constitute a robust empirical test of continuity. They are far from 
comprehensive, examining only a scattering of communication technologies and determinants, 
and they use different definitions, methodologies and samples. What this suggests is the need for 
a more comprehensive and methodologically consistent analysis. We seek to undertake such an 
analysis using econometric estimation techniques and panel data on mail, telegram, telephone and 
internet uptake. We test the following four hypotheses: wealth, education, institutional quality 
and trade openness respectively have a positive influence on per capita uptake of the internet, 
mail, telegram and the telephone. 
 
Methodology 
Our scalar unit of analysis in the present study is the state. We readily admit that analyzing 
technological diffusion at the country-level potentially masks a great deal of sub-national 
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geographic variability – e.g. between urban and rural areas – in levels of availability, access 
and/or usage over time (Graham 2002; Standage 1998). Yet we maintain that our 
“methodologically nationalist” approach nevertheless remains a useful one for understanding the 
factors which shape telecommunications connectivity over time. 
 
Dependent variable 
Our dependent variables for the present study are the respective annual growth rates in a 
country’s per capita uptake of mail, electric telegraph, telephones and the internet. The first two 
of these, mail and telegraph, are examples of what Kellerman (2006) labels “public mobilities”. 
Telephones and the internet, on the other hand, are “personal motilities”. As their name suggests, 
public mobilities involve the use of communication technologies designed for the public at large, 
access to which is mediated through operating agents which may lie outside the user’s private 
sphere (Milne 2009). Conversely, personal mobilities involve ‘self-propelled’ communications 
through media, often characterized by greater accessibility and convenience to private users. 
Whereas the mediated nature of public mobilities implies temporally lagged communications 
amongst participants, the individual character of personal mobilities allow near instantaneous 
communication, reception and transmission between geographically distanciated actors (see 
Kellerman 2006).  
We use a flow measure of usage for mail and telegrams, for which we have data on the 
number of mail items and telegrams sent, both on a per capita basis. We also deploy a usage 
metric for the internet, albeit one that measures numbers of internet users per capita, rather than 
actual levels of usage (e.g. number of hours online). For telephones, on the other hand, we are 
forced to use a stock measure of infrastructure, in the form of numbers of telephones per capita. 
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We would have preferred to use exactly the same type of measure across the four technologies, 
but data limitations mean that this was simply not possible.  
Data for our dependent variables for mail, telegram and telephone are taken from Mitchell 
(2003). In the case of mail and telegraph, the data stretch as far back as 1830 and 1850, 
respectively, but comprehensive trade data are unavailable before 1870, so our panel starts with 
this year for these variables. For telephones, our panel starts in 1890. The telegraph panel ends 
before 1970.1 For mail and telephones, the panel stops in 1992 due to unavailability of the 
historical trade measure variable beyond this point. Lack of data for the dependent and/or the 
explanatory variables mean that the sample covers 68, 64 and 101 countries for mail, telegram 
and telephones uptake, respectively. This is short of universal coverage, but all samples cover not 
only high-income countries, but also a wide range of low-income ones. (Details of countries and 
the relevant time periods included in each of the estimations can be found in the appendix). Our 
dependent variable for the internet uses data from World Bank (2005). These data begin in 1991, 
but the sample ends in 2003, owing to lack of data on some of the explanatory variables. 
Countries enter and – occasionally – exit (e.g. during times of war) the dataset according 
to the availability of data. Our panel is therefore “unbalanced”, but the panel estimators used in 
the present study are able to accommodate such data. In cases where territorial changes have 
occurred during the period of study (e.g. Germany), the data refer to the country in the borders 
during the year in question. All our variables are normalized by either GDP or population, which 
also vary with territory, such that boundary changes do not represent a major problem for the 
analysis. 
                                                 
1
 Since we are only interested in the determinants of uptake growth, we restrict our analysis to the period 
before 1970, during which time the number of sent telegrams is expanding in the vast majority of 
countries. After this date, telegraph usage begins to decline, sometimes quite dramatically.  
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We chose to focus on postal mail, the electric telegraph and the telephone because of their 
historic role in communication. All three technologies have – to a greater or lesser extent, and for 
longer or shorter periods of time – assumed central importance in allowing actors to 
communicate over space. The chronology of the technologies runs as follows. Modern, pre-paid 
and publicly accessible postal services began to operate in the first half of the nineteenth century, 
many of them as public monopolies (John 1986; Willmore 2002). Postal mail was joined in the 
second half of the nineteenth century by the electric telegraph. (Standage 1998). The electric 
telephone first emerged in late 1870s, although it was not until the second half of the twentieth 
century that telephones became more widely used outside the core of high income, industrialized 
economies (Hugill 1999; Guillén and Suárez 2005). The internet dates back to the late 1960s and 
1970s in university and military settings, but only began to be adopted by a wider range of 
consumer, business and governmental actors in the early 1990s (Warf 2001; Shiode et al. 2004). 
Still, despite becoming one of the fastest diffusing technologies ever, the density of hosts, 




The four main explanatory variables included in the study – GDP per capita, education, 
institutional quality and trade openness – were selected because they have all been identified in 
recent empirical studies as correlates of national internet availability, access and/or usage. We do 
not explore the role of telecommunications regulatory policy or prices – simply because there are 
no comparable historical data for competition (and other) policies or user prices for mail, 
telegram and telephone markets. Still, to the extent that no previous studies have analyzed the 
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role of wealth, education, institutional quality and trade in the uptake of our four different 
communication technologies, we believe that our study makes an important contribution to the 
literature.  
Data for GDP per capita is taken from Maddison (2003). For education, we use data on 
primary schooling since, strictly speaking, not much more than basic education is necessary for 
the use of communication technologies. In the case of the internet, we take the primary enrolment 
ratio, using data from World Bank (2005). These data only cover the period from the 1960s 
onwards and we therefore use Mitchell’s (2003) data on the number of primary school students 
per capita for mail, telegrams and telephone. 
In order to capture institutional quality, we use Henisz’s (2000) metric of political 
constraints, which is the only available measure that reaches far enough back into the past. It 
measures the extent to which political actors are constrained in their future policy choices by the 
existence of other political actors with veto power, and by the distribution of political preferences 
across and within these branches of the political system. That is, it captures the degree to which 
governments are able to credibly commit to maintaining an existing regulatory regime, and 
therefore the degree of investment risk. Henisz’s data have been used to measure institutional 
quality in previous studies investigating the uneven diffusion of telecommunication technologies 
(Henisz and Zelner 2001; Andonova 2006), but it is an admittedly crude proxy variable for 
institutional quality. Our trade measure – trade openness – is given by the sum of exports and 
imports divided by GDP. For the internet, we use data from the World Bank (2005). However, 
because these data do not stretch far back in time, we construct a measure of trade openness for 
our three historical technologies using data from Barbieri (1998) and Maddison (2003). Table 1 
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lists the variables, the underlying concept measured, whether the variable represents a proxy for 
this concept, together with respective data sources. 
   
Dealing with statistical problems 
An important statistical challenge is how to deal with the fact that uptake of new technological 
innovations characteristically accelerates over time, as they benefit from increasing returns to 
adoption (Rogers 1995). Such dynamics have been observed empirically in the historic spread of 
communication technologies such as the electric telegraph and telephones (Shiode et al. 2004), as 
well as the internet (Chinn & Fairlie 2006). Within the present study, we control for these 
temporal dynamics by including year-specific time dummies, which potentially capture global 
changes in the availability, cost and functionality of any one technology that affect all countries 
equally. 
We additionally include the natural log of the per capita technology uptake, lagged by one 
year. This controls for conditional convergence. The rate of diffusion of many technologies is 
influenced by the existing levels of penetration, in that countries with higher levels of uptake 
characteristically experience slower uptake growth (Henisz and Zelner 2001; Perkins and 
Neumayer 2005). We also include the lagged log of technology uptake to control for 
autocorrelation in the error term (Beck and Katz 1996). The growth rate is equivalent to the 
natural log of a variable minus its natural log one previous period. Hence regressing the growth 
rate on the log-level lagged by one period is equivalent to regressing the log-level on the lagged 
log-level. The only difference is that the estimated coefficient of the growth rate equation is that 
of the log-level equation minus one. What is important here is that the inclusion of what is 
effectively a lagged dependent variable (LDV) allows us to indirectly control for autocorrelation. 
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We employ standard errors that are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity to deal with the other 
common problem of statistical inference. 
Another statistical issue is reverse causality which causes problems because the variable 
that is subject to reverse causality is also correlated with the error term. The one variable that is 
likely to be most affected by reverse causality is trade openness. Higher levels of trade openness 
may well be instrumental in accelerating the domestic uptake of new communication 
technologies. Yet uptake of new communication technologies may also stimulate higher levels of 
trade by, for example, enabling the functioning of regional and international production systems 
(Lew and Cater 2006; Clarke and Wallsten 2007). We deal with this problem by using a dynamic 
panel data estimator in which trade openness is treated as an endogenous variable (see below). 
 
Estimation technique 
Panel data – of the sort used here – is typically estimated with either a random- or a fixed-effects 
estimator. The advantage of the random-effects estimator is that it is more efficient because 
estimation is based on variation over time within countries, as well as on variation across 
countries. The country fixed-effects estimator, on the other hand, exclusively uses the within- or 
over-time variation in countries. Fixed-effects estimation is particularly inefficient for 
explanatory variables that change little over time. The disadvantage of a random-effects estimator 
is that it produces inconsistent estimates if the country-specific fixed-effects are systematically 
correlated with one of the explanatory variables.  
In the next section, we first report random-effects estimation results. Formally, this is 
modeled as follows: 
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where i denotes each country and t each year, y is technology uptake per capita and the 
random effects assumption is that the unobserved random effects iα  have zero mean and are 
uncorrelated with each of the explanatory variables. We additionally report results from a fixed-
effects estimation, which models the iα  no longer as a random part of the error process, but as 
country-specific fixed effects. Lastly, because (1) fixed-effects estimations are slightly biased in 
the presence of the LDV (Nickell 1981) and (2) we wish to explicitly declare trade openness as 
an endogenous variable, we also use Arellano and Bond’s (1991) dynamic generalized method of 
moments (GMM) estimator.2 This estimator removes country fixed-effects by first-differencing 
the data. The first difference of the LDV and of the endogenous variable are instrumented for by 
the levels of each variable lagged by at least two periods. Our T, the total time period, is 
relatively large, which would give a very large number of potential instruments. However, 
because using too many instruments can bias the estimation results (Roodman 2007), we restrict 
the use of lagged instruments to a total maximum of eleven. 
 
Results  
Table 2 reports random-effects estimation results. Consistent with past empirical research, GDP 
per capita, education, trade openness and institutional quality are found to be positive and 
statistically significant correlates of domestic growth in internet users. Across all four 
technologies, we also find that countries with a higher level of penetration in the previous year 
                                                 
2
 We say “slight” bias because the Nickell (1981) bias diminishes as T, the time period covered by the 
estimations, increases and (with the exception of our internet estimations) T is large. 
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experience lower growth rates, a phenomenon well-documented in the innovation diffusion 
literature (Perkins and Neumayer 2005).3  
 
Table 2 around here 
 
Of greater interest is the question of whether the determinants of uptake growth for our 
three historic communication technologies match the internet’s. In the case of wealth, we find 
such similarity, with GDP per capita positively and statistically significantly correlated with the 
uptake of telegrams and telephones. This is entirely plausible. Like the internet, previous 
communication technologies involved large, up-front capital investments, and their expansion is 
likely to have depended on the ability of consumers to afford user charges. GDP per capita is 
insignificant for mail, but becomes statistically significant in the fixed-effects estimation (see 
below). 
Turning to education, we find that the number of primary-schooled students is positively 
and statistically significantly correlated with telegrams sent and telephones per capita. This is 
consistent with idea that uptake depends on peoples’ ability to use communications media and 
therefore some basic level of schooling. Again, the education variable is statistically insignificant 
for mail in the random-effects estimation, but becomes significant in the fixed effects estimation 
(see below). 
However, our measure of institutional quality appears to have no statistically significant 
influence on any of the three historic communication technologies, with coefficients for mail, 
telegrams and telephones statistically indistinguishable from zero. Although contradicting 
                                                 
3
 The coefficient sizes should not be compared with each other across the technologies. The samples are 
too different, particularly with respect to time, for such a comparison to be useful. 
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conventional wisdom about the importance of institutional quality on large infrastructural 
investments, our results might simply reflect the leading role played by the private sector in 
financing internet growth (Warf 2001). While mail, telegraph and telephone systems often began 
their life in the private sector, a large share of investments in expanding these systems were 
subsequently made by public actors (John 1996; Willmore 2002). And because private actors are 
likely to be more sensitive to domestic factors influencing investment returns, differences in 
ownership provide a possible explanation for this anomalous result. 
Finally, for trade openness, we find consistency throughout. As with internet users, mail 
items, telegrams and telephones per capita are all positive and statistically significant correlates 
of a country’s share of trade in GDP. A possible explanation for this finding is that, by exposing 
firms to greater competition, domestic imports and exports might stimulate demand for 
productivity-enhancing communication technologies. Higher levels of trade are also likely to 
expand demand for communication technologies to the extent that it implies the need for 
increased long-distance transactions between actors in different countries. As per epidemic 
models of diffusion, international trade additionally potentially supports cross-country learning, 
with actors in countries more open to trade more likely to learn about the benefits of new 
communication technologies. 
Note that the reported R-squared values are relatively low. This is because we have 
chosen to take the growth rate in uptake as the dependent variable. If we had taken the logged 
uptake level as the dependent variable instead, then the R-squared values would be far higher 
(above .9), while the estimated coefficients and standard errors of all the explanatory variables 
other than the LDV would be exactly identical. The coefficient of the LDV itself would be that of 
the growth rate estimation plus one, as pointed out above, while the standard error would again 
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be identical. The relatively low reported R-squared values should therefore not be mistaken as 
evidence of a poor fit of our model: measures of fit tend to be low when the estimating equation 
is in growth rates rather than in levels. 
In table 3, we trade-off efficiency for potential gains in consistency of estimations by 
estimating a fixed-effects model instead. For the three historical technologies, the results are all 
in line with the random-effects estimation results, except that per capita income and primary 
education variables now become statistically significant with the expected positive coefficient 
sign for mail.4  
In the case of the internet, however, there is a dramatic difference between the random- 
and the country fixed-effects results. With the exceptions of the existing uptake level and per 
capita income, all of the other explanatory variables are statistically insignificant. How might we 
explain this discrepancy? Most likely, the answer lies in the fact that these explanatory variables 
change relatively little during the short span of internet diffusion, such that the fixed-effects 
estimation becomes extremely inefficient. The fixed-effects, together with the existing level of 
uptake, absorb an enormous amount of variation in the data over the thirteen years of data 
covered in the study. Hence the fixed-effects estimator most likely fails to identify the effect of 
the socioeconomic determinants.  
 
Table 3 around here 
 
                                                 
4
 We have no explanation for why the political constraints variable becomes significantly negative in case 
of mail. Yet institutional quality is a variable that changes very little over time. For such variables, it is not 
uncommon for the estimated coefficient sign to switch in moving from random- to fixed-effects 
estimations. 
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In table 4, we account for Nickell (1981) bias and the potential endogeneity of trade 
openness by using the GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991). For this estimator, the 
dependent variable now has to be the (logged) uptake level. As pointed out above, regressing the 
log-level on the lagged log-level is equivalent to regressing the growth rate on the lagged log-
level, the only difference being that the estimated coefficient of the growth rate equation is that of 
the log-level equation minus one. The GMM estimation results are very similar to the fixed-
effects results in terms of sign and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients. In 
particular, trade openness, the endogenous variable, remains a statistically significant and 
positive determinant of mail, telegram and telephones uptake.5 This suggests that our results are 
robust to correcting for the Nickell (1981) bias originating from the LDV and accounting for the 
potential endogeneity of trade openness. 
 
Table 4 around here 
 
Conclusion 
Amongst the concerns surrounding the internet is that it will give rise to new socio-spatial 
inequalities forged around informational divides between the so-called digital “haves” and “have 
nots”. Underlying these fears is the observation that the global internet network is not available 
“anywhere and everywhere” (Graham 1998, p. 168) but, rather, its grounding in place crucially 
                                                 
5
 Note that the number of observations is slightly smaller in the GMM estimation compared to the 
random- and fixed-effects estimations due to the need for instrumenting the lagged dependent and 
endogenous variable with further lags. The GMM estimation results have to be regarded with some 
caution as the estimator is more suitable for samples with smaller T. Also, the estimator depends on the 
assumption that there is no second-order autocorrelation. Fortunately, test results reported in the table 
suggest that this hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
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depends on geographic factors influencing the demand for the internet and the ability of actors to 
supply this demand (Agnew 2001; Sassen 2002; Warf 2007). Our aim in the present article has 
been to place these anxieties within context by examining whether the adoption of previous 
technologies – namely, mail, telegrams, telephone – at the national level was shaped by similar 
socioeconomic attributes identified in recent work as enabling or constraining the domestic 
uptake of the internet. That is, we seek to address the question of whether uptake of the internet is 
more a product of material geography than previous communication technologies, and therefore 
more prone to reproducing existing geographically-inscribed inequalities.  
Our statistical results reveal a striking level of continuity in the territorially-grounded 
socioeconomic attributes shaping the uptake of different communication technologies 
constitutive of public (i.e. mail and telegraph) and personal mobilities (i.e. telephone and internet) 
over the past one-and-a-half centuries. We thus find income has not only influenced spatial 
variations in the growth of internet users per capita at the country-level over time, but the same 
applies to mail, telegrams and telephone systems. Historical continuity is also apparent in the 
case of education and international trade: levels of primary education emerge as a positive 
statistical correlate of domestic growth rates for mail, telegrams, telephones and internet users. 
Similarly, we find that trade openness is associated with a faster growth rate of all four 
communication technologies examined in the present study. Transnational networks via export 
and import linkages would, in other words, appear to act as a catalyst for the domestic expansion 
of communication services, both old and new. The sole exception is institutional quality. While 
identified as a statistically significant correlate of internet usage, we find that institutional quality 
had no statistically significant influence on uptake of mail, telegrams or telephones. 
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 Our findings therefore indicate that internet usage would, for the most part, appear to be 
unfolding unevenly across geographic space according to long-standing geographic determinants 
which similarly influenced cross-national variations in the uptake of previous communication 
technologies. While the internet may be new, in other words, many of the factors governing its 
uptake are not. To this extent, our results contribute to a growing body of work which has sought 
to caution against claims about the supposed novelty of the internet, and the suggestion that it is 
somehow different (Graham 1998; Malecki 2002; Zook et al. 2004; The Economist 2007).  
  Turning to debates about the digital divide, our statistical results indicate that the internet 
is not uniquely prone to geographically-produced inequality. That is, usage of the internet does 
not generally appear to be more a product of the attributes of place than the availability and/or 
usage of previous communication technologies. We  would qualify this statement by noting that 
the internet is the only one of the four communication technologies whose uptake has been 
affected by institutional quality. Further, because of data limitations, we cannot test the influence 
of telecommunications regulatory policies and/or user prices, which are known to influence 
uptake of the internet. Yet the finding that wealth, education and trade have produced inequalities 
across the three historic communication technologies examined here suggests that the way in 
which material geographies affect the internet is not unique. 
All of this does not mean that public policy-makers should not worry about the digital 
divide. Approximately four-fifths of the world’s population remains “offline” indicating that, 
despite ongoing catch-up in the number of users in developing countries, a significant global 
divide persists (Dutta and Mia 2008). Indeed, if historic communication technologies are 
anything to go by, geographic disparities are likely to continue to narrow in the 21st century but 
not disappear. Another reason to warn against complacency is that statistics indicating a growing 
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number of users in developing countries, and a narrowing gap with developed economies, may 
hide as much as they reveal. For a start, aggregate country-level figures for internet access, 
infrastructure or usage conceal some of the multiple domestic divides of the internet, manifest in 
variations between different geographical areas or social groups (Norris 2001; Warf 2001). 
Moreover, as pointed out by Graham (2008), the relationship between internet access/availability 
and development is far more complex than binary accounts of usage/non-usage suggest. For 
example, the ability of domestic actors to exploit the commercial opportunities provided by the 
internet – e.g. by penetrating foreign markets – will be mediated by a complex of additional 
place-based, extra-territorial and international factors. Indeed, there is a danger of focusing solely 
on internet access, and of over-emphasizing internet-based development approaches to the 
exclusion of other crucial development interventions (Chin 2005; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Lal 
2005). Still, to the extent that inequalities in internet access and availability may affect human 
development, tackling the divide remains a matter of public concern. Our finding that the factors 
producing the divide are not altogether new suggests that policy-makers might draw useful 
lessons from the past in seeking to advance uptake of the internet. 
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Table 1. Dependent and explanatory variables summary. 
Variable Underlying concept Proxy variable Source 
internet users p.c. Technology uptake flow No World Bank (2005) 
mail items sent p.c. Technology uptake flow No Mitchell (2003) 
telegrams sent p.c. Technology uptake flow No Mitchell (2003) 
telephones p.c. Technology uptake flow Yes Mitchell (2003) 
ln GDP p.c. Wealth No Maddison (2003) 
& World Bank (2005) 
Primary enrolment ratio Human capital No World Bank (2005) 
Primary students p.c. Human capital No Mitchell (2003) 
Political constraints Institutional quality Yes Henisz (2000) 
Trade/GDP Trade openness No Barbieri (1998), 
Mitchell (2003) 
& World Bank (2005) 
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Table 2. Random-effects estimation results. 
 internet mail telegram telephones 
ln (internet users p.c.)t-1 -0.231***    
 (0.0182)    
ln (mail items p.c.)t-1  -0.0104***   
  (0.00402)   
ln (telegrams p.c.)t-1   -0.0765***  
   (0.0126)  
ln (telephones p.c.)t-1    -0.0463*** 
    (0.00624) 
ln GDP p.c. 0.171*** 0.0109 0.0524*** 0.0834*** 
 (0.0214) (0.00749) (0.0153) (0.0112) 
Primary enrolment ratio 0.00180*    
 (0.000965)    
Primary students p.c.  0.0506 0.928** 0.296* 
  (0.157) (0.397) (0.172) 
Institutional quality 0.103* 0.00288 -0.0189 -0.00488 
 (0.0615) (0.0137) (0.0250) (0.0128) 
Trade/GDP 0.143*** 0.00790** 0.00709** 0.0295*** 
 (0.0357) (0.00366) (0.00319) (0.0104) 
R-squared (overall) 0.444 0.078 0.154 0.163 
Observations 1213 2690 1723 3774 
Time period 1991-2003 1870-1992 1870-1969 1880-1992 
Countries 148 68 64 101 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual growth rate in technology uptake. Absolute z-values 
in parentheses. Regional dummies and year-specific time dummies included, but not reported. 
*  significant at .1 level  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level. 
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Table 3. Fixed-effects estimation results. 
 
 internet mail telegram telephones 
ln (internet users p.c.)t-1 -0.393***    
 (0.0305)    
ln (mail items p.c.)t-1  -0.0931***   
  (0.0159)   
ln (telegrams p.c.)t-1   -0.104***  
   (0.0168)  
ln (telephones p.c.)t-1    -0.0643*** 
    (0.00745) 
ln GDP p.c. 0.375 0.144*** 0.0822** 0.111*** 
 (0.331) (0.0314) (0.0365) (0.0147) 
Primary enrolment ratio 0.00534    
 (0.00391)    
Primary students p.c.  0.571** 1.252*** 0.553** 
  (0.277) (0.274) (0.234) 
Institutional quality -0.0322 -0.0543** -0.00216 -0.0276 
 (0.136) (0.0221) (0.0300) (0.0182) 
Trade/GDP -0.0765 0.00943* 0.00718*** 0.0450* 
 (0.179) (0.00504) (0.00212) (0.0269) 
R-squared (within) 0.513 0.127 0.224 0.191 
Observations 1213 2690 1723 3774 
Time period 1991-2003 1870-1992 1870-1969 1880-1992 
Countries 148 68 64 101 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual growth rate in technology uptake. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Country dummies and year-specific time dummies included, but not reported. 
*  significant at .1 level  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level. 
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Table 4. Generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation results. 
 internet mail telegram telephones 
ln (internet users p.c.)t-1 0.708***    
 (0.0377)    
ln (mail items p.c.)t-1  0.683***   
  (0.0345)   
ln (telegrams p.c.)t-1   0.737***  
   (0.0354)  
ln (telephones p.c.)t-1    0.867*** 
    (0.0475) 
ln GDP p.c. 0.427 0.207*** 0.162*** 0.101** 
 (0.441) (0.0573) (0.0509) (0.0488) 
Primary enrolment ratio 0.00328    
 (0.00521)    
Primary students p.c.  1.660*** 1.765*** 1.352*** 
  (0.290) (0.276) (0.308) 
Institutional quality -0.143 0.0119 0.0982** -0.0262 
 (0.142) (0.0288) (0.0423) (0.0279) 
Trade/GDP 0.301 0.00689*** 0.00690*** 0.122** 
 (0.363) (0.00237) (0.00212) (0.0495) 










Observations 1059 2759 1526 3449 
Time period 1991-2003 1870-1992 1870-1969 1881-1992 
Countries 148 68 59 101 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of technology uptake. Absolute z-values in 
parentheses. Year-specific time dummies included, but not reported. Trade openness assumed to 
be endogenous. 
*  significant at .1 level  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level. 
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Figure 1. The global digital divide. 
 
Note: Darker colors represent higher numbers of internet users per capita (2005-2007 average). 
Source: World Bank (2009).  
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Appendix. Country and time coverage of samples. 
 Internet Mail Telegram Telephone 
Country Start End Start End Start End Start End 
Afghanistan 1996 2003     1959 1980 
Albania 1996 2003       
Algeria 1995 2002 1964 1992 1964 1969 1962 1992 
Angola 1997 1999     1980 1991 
Argentina 1993 2002 1931 1991 1933 1969 1928 1991 
Armenia 2000 2003       
Australia 1991 2003 1966 1976 1968 1969 1966 1984 
Austria 1991 2003 1923 1992 1924 1969 1923 1992 
Azerbaijan 1995 2002       
Bahrain 1996 2003       
Bangladesh 1998 2003     1975 1992 
Belarus 1995 2003       
Belgium 1991 2003 1872 1991 1872 1969 1897 1991 
Benin 1997 2003     1961 1992 
Bolivia 1996 2002     1948 1990 
Botswana 1993 2002       
Brazil 1992 2002   1873 1969 1928 1992 
Bulgaria 1994 2003     1910 1992 
Burkina Faso 1997 2003     1960 1992 
Burundi 1997 2003     1964 1992 
Cambodia 1998 2003       
Cameroon 1998 2002 1968 1970 1965 1965 1961 1992 
Canada 1991 2002       
Central African Republic 1997 2002     1962 1990 
Chad 1998 2001     1961 1992 
Chile 1993 2003 1924 1992 1924 1967 1924 1992 
China 1994 2003 1950 1992 1950 1969 1950 1992 
Colombia 1995 2003 1912 1981 1924 1969 1924 1992 
Comoros 2000 2003       
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1997 2000 1974 1974 1967 1969 1961 1992 
Congo, Rep. 2002 2003     1963 1992 
Costa Rica 1993 2002     1952 1992 
Cote d'Ivoire 1996 2003 1965 1978 1960 1969 1960 1992 
Croatia 1994 2003       
Cuba       1945 1974 
Cyprus 1993 1999       
Czech Republic 1994 2003 1921 1992 1921 1969 1948 1990 
Denmark 1991 2002 1893 1992 1893 1969 1902 1992 
Djibouti 1996 2003       
Dominican Republic 1996 2003     1950 1981 
Ecuador 1993 2003     1960 1992 
Egypt 1994 2003 1951 1985 1951 1953 1951 1992 
El Salvador 1997 2003   1941 1969 1941 1992 
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Equatorial Guinea 1998 1998       
Eritrea 1998 2003       
Estonia 1993 2003       
Ethiopia 1996 2003     1952 1992 
Fiji 1994 2001       
Finland 1991 2003 1919 1992 1919 1969 1928 1990 
France 1991 2003 1875 1992 1875 1969 1890 1985 
Gabon 1998 2003     1961 1991 
Gambia, The 1996 2000       
Georgia 1996 2003       
Germany 1991 2003 1900 1992 1900 1969 1900 1992 
Ghana 1996 2002 1957 1975 1957 1968 1957 1992 
Greece 1992 2003 1926 1985 1926 1969 1936 1985 
Guatemala 1996 2002     1955 1992 
Guinea 1995 2003     1959 1992 
Guinea-Bissau 1998 2001       
Guyana 1997 2002       
Haiti       1950 1968 
Honduras 1996 2002     1936 1991 
Hungary 1992 2003 1966 1992 1924 1969 1924 1992 
Iceland 1992 2003       
India 1993 2003 1960 1990 1960 1969 1960 1992 
Indonesia 1995 2003 1949 1992 1949 1969 1949 1992 
Iran 1995 2003 1954 1991   1952 1992 
Iraq   1950 1969 1950 1969 1950 1992 
Ireland 1992 2003 1926 1992 1926 1969 1926 1992 
Israel 1991 2002 1950 1992 1950 1969 1951 1992 
Italy 1991 2003 1895 1992 1895 1969 1895 1990 
Jamaica 1995 2002 1962 1991 1964 1969 1962 1991 
Japan 1991 2003 1876 1992 1873 1969 1952 1985 
Jordan 1996 2003       
Kazakhstan 1995 2002       
Kenya 1996 2002 1964 1992   1964 1992 
Korea, Rep. 1991 2003 1952 1992   1953 1992 
Kuwait 1994 2003       
Kyrgyz Republic 1999 2003       
Lao PDR 1999 2000       
Latvia 1997 2003       
Lebanon 1997 2002 1950 1972 1950 1969 1960 1991 
Lesotho 1997 2002       
Libya 2000 2002 1959 1974     
Lithuania 1997 2003       
Luxembourg 1993 2003       
Macedonia, FYR 1996 2000       
Madagascar 1997 2003 1962 1984 1962 1969 1962 1992 
Malawi 1998 2003 1965 1986 1965 1969 1965 1992 
Malaysia 1993 2003 1960 1992 1961 1969 1960 1992 
Maldives 2000 2001       
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Mali 1997 2002     1966 1992 
Mauritania 1998 2003       
Mauritius 1997 2003     1968 1992 
Mexico 1992 2003 1907 1992 1907 1969 1945 1992 
Moldova 1995 2003       
Mongolia 1996 2003       
Morocco 1996 2003 1962 1978 1957 1969 1957 1992 
Mozambique 1997 2002 1976 1977   1976 1992 
Myanmar   1960 1975 1954 1967 1954 1992 
Namibia 1996 2003       
Nepal 1996 2002       
Netherlands 1991 2003 1871 1989 1870 1964 1901 1990 
New Zealand 1993 2003 1920 1992 1930 1969 1920 1992 
Nicaragua 1995 2002     1938 1992 
Niger 1997 2002     1961 1992 
Nigeria 1997 2003 1960 1982 1960 1965 1960 1992 
Norway 1991 2003 1905 1992 1905 1969 1905 1990 
Oman 1998 2002       
Pakistan 1999 2002 1958 1992 1958 1969 1958 1992 
Panama 1995 2003     1955 1992 
Papua New Guinea 1997 2002       
Paraguay 1997 2003       
Peru 1995 2003 1919 1959 1919 1959 1938 1992 
Philippines 1995 2002 1963 1992 1954 1969 1954 1992 
Poland 1992 2003       
Portugal 1992 2002 1929 1991 1933 1969 1926 1987 
Romania 1994 2003 1926 1985 1926 1969 1926 1975 
Russian Federation 1993 2000       
Rwanda 1997 2002     1965 1991 
Saudi Arabia 1996 2003     1955 1992 
Senegal 1996 2003     1960 1992 
Sierra Leone 1997 2002     1964 1991 
Singapore   1965 1991 1965 1969 1965 1988 
Slovak Republic 1998 2003       
Slovenia 1994 2002       
Solomon Islands 2000 2001       
South Africa 1992 2002       
Spain 1991 2003 1908 1990 1885 1969 1908 1992 
Sri Lanka 1995 2003 1980 1992   1980 1987 
Sudan 1998 2003   1959 1969 1971 1991 
Swaziland 1996 2003       
Sweden 1991 2002 1890 1992 1890 1969 1916 1992 
Switzerland 1991 2002 1881 1961 1884 1961 1901 1961 
Syrian Arab Republic 1998 2000 1950 1988 1950 1969 1951 1988 
Tajikistan 2000 2003       
Tanzania 1997 2003 1966 1992 1969 1969 1963 1992 
Thailand 1993 2003 1913 1992 1913 1969 1952 1992 
Togo 1997 2003   1961 1966 1961 1991 
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Trinidad and Tobago 1996 2002 1967 1992   1967 1992 
Tunisia 1995 2003 1959 1983 1959 1969 1959 1992 
Turkey 1994 2003 1950 1992 1950 1969 1950 1992 
Uganda 1996 2003 1962 1977 1969 1969 1962 1991 
Ukraine 1994 2002       
United Arab Emirates 1996 2003       
United Kingdom 1991 2002 1870 1992 1871 1969 1895 1983 
United States 1991 2002 1890 1992 1871 1968 1880 1982 
Uruguay 1995 2001 1883 1947 1928 1968 1890 1992 
Uzbekistan 1996 2003       
Venezuela, RB 1993 2003 1931 1976 1926 1969 1926 1992 
Vietnam 1997 2003 1963 1973 1963 1969 1963 1990 
Yemen, Rep. 1997 2000       
Yugoslavia, FR 1999 2001       
Zambia 1995 2003 1965 1981 1969 1969 1964 1990 
Zimbabwe 1995 2002 1979 1986   1980 1992 
 
 
